How France’s Crisis Threatens the European Centre

The French state is in crisis. At what level this crisis lies, whether it be merely the
mistakes of a particular executive, or something more fundamental, has inspired vigorous
debate. It is suggested by certain media and politicians, somewhat overenthusiastically, that
this embodies a constitutional or institutional crisis. Proponents of this view argue that structural flaws in the current
French constitution make such crises inevitable. However, reexamination of the causes
reveals that the fault lies not in the constitution but in the political pressures applied
specifically to Emmanuel Macron’s administration.

France is currently governed by its fourth minority government since the 2024
legislative elections, the first three of which have been defeated by an inability to pass
economic reforms.
The budgetary issue is a consequence of France’s slowing growth, combined with its high
debt, which is, in part, due to its high welfare spending. President Macron
and his supporters conclude that it is necessary to reduce spending, for example, by passing
unpopular reforms to pensions or austerity measures. There is no parliamentary majority in
the National Assembly, and the unpopularity of both the cuts and Macron makes the political
blocs content to obstruct any such reforms. France, unlike other states
with proportional representation, hosts a majoritarian political culture which disincentivises
coalition building. The believed need for cuts is
therefore at odds with the current political arrangement.

The implicit conclusion of criticisms of the Fifth Republic’s constitution is that if the
assembly were empowered, the parties would negotiate a consensual solution. To better
understand this argument, we must travel through time to 1958. The Fourth French Republic
had been through 5 prime ministers in 4 years, had been fighting unsuccessful colonial wars
for two decades, and now faced the threat of invasion from its own army in Algeria. While the
Algerian crisis brought down the republic, there Charles de Gaulle believed that the root of
the problem lay with the constitution itself: too much power lay with the assembly to dismiss
governments, with party polarisation leading to endless instability in government. His
solution was an empowered executive. The only way to avoid civil war was to invest as
President of the Council of Ministers General Charles de Gaulle, and grant
him exceptional powers, including to begin the process of reconstituting the republic. This
new Fifth French Republic gave the executive much stronger powers, and rendered the
office of the President clearly superior in competence to the assembly; the parliamentary
republic became at least semi-presidential.

In 1958, as now, the crisis at hand constituted cabinet instability due to a polarised
body politic. To disempower the executive at this time would plunge France into an even
more severe state of political paralysis. As in 1958, there are three major political groups: a
highly unpopular centre, an intransigent left wing keen to flex the muscles of strike and
protest, and a right wing highly sceptical of the system and unwilling to support coalitions.
Unlike in 1958, there is no leader who could garner such huge support for constitutional
change as de Gaulle did. The lack of faith in Macron
compared to de Gaulle therefore lies at the heart of the difference in
success of the two premiers. In other words, when people criticise the constitution’s
preference for executive power, they are really criticising Macron’s specific use of that power.
In other words, we are witnessing a crisis of confidence, not Constitution.
Undeniably, there are good reasons to question Macron’s use of the executive: the
appointment of centre-right prime ministers despite the left wing parliamentary plurality; the
reliance on article 49.3 of the constitution, which allows the government to push through
legislation without parliamentary support, to make reforms to social welfare; and the
unwillingness to call a parliamentary election to resolve the hung parliament driving the
political difficulties are all valid complaints. Despite this, the current government under
Lecornu seems intent on delivering a budget based on negotiations with and concessions to
the left based on the pausing of the controversial pension age raise, and
modifications to wealth tax.

What ought to trouble foreign observers is that the true roots of the crisis are
disturbingly close to home: weakening support for national institutions,
economic uncertainty, and the polarisation of the electorate which makes coalition-building
more difficult, especially given the majoritarian nature of French democracy. No party wishes
to attach itself to the unpopularity of the centrist executive, which makes negotiating crucial
legislation like the budget increasingly difficult. This legislature and culture make France
highly vulnerable to the ravages of the current political climate, but the same underlying
problems exist in other European countries. Stripping the issue of its France-specific
qualities, the situation consists of a moderate executive who must balance the threat of the
rising far-right with the intransigence of the left-wing against the need for economic reform.
Members of the Labour Party in the UK or the CDU in Germany will find this a familiar
dilemma.

In summary, France’s current political crisis consists not of a constitutional crisis
brought about by a tyrannical executive, but rather in a political inability to deal with the
specific current economic and social factors. Therefore, let not France’s vulnerability compel
faith in the invincibility of other countries. The other two largest European economies – the
UK and Germany – face similar challenges and the French response to conditions will either
become a harbinger of a doomed European centrism, or its model for salvation.